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NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW SECTION 3031 AS FAIR
DISMISSAL PROCEDURE FOR THE PROBATIONARY TEACHER,

OR
FAIR IS FOUL
INTRODUCTION

Recently enacted section 3031 of New York's Education Law1 has
been widely touted as "fair-dismissal" legislation. The statute requires
that a superintendent's recommendation to dismiss a probationary
teacher be reviewed by the local board of education or board of cooperative educational services.&2 It permits the teacher to request a written statement of the reasons for which dismissal has been recommended, and requires that the teacher be furnished such requested
statement prior to the board's review. Further, it allows the teacher
to file a written response to the furnished statement.
This Comment will analyze the new statute in order to determine
just how fair New York's "fair-dismissal" law is. It will discuss the
reasons for enactment of section 3031, the problems the law was intended to resolve, and the rights it is supposed to protect. There will be
an examination of effects the statute has had on dismissal procedure
thus far, and those it might have in the future. In conclusion, existing
alternative procedures will be evaluated and proposed alternatives set
forth.
I.

THE NECESSITY FOR PRETERMINATION PROCEDURES

A. Teachers Distinguished from Other Civil Servants
New York's public school teachers are part of the state's civil
service. When a civil service employee has gained permanent appointment, called "tenure" in the case of teachers, his employer must adhere to the procedures which customarily characterize a "due-process
1. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3031 (McKinney Supp. 1973).

2. Hereinafter referred to as BOCES. BOGES are organized under the provisions of
N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 1950 (McKinney Supp. 1972) primarily for the purpose of providing specialized professionals to school districts which, because of sparsity of pupils, or
for other reasons, cannot economically otherwise provide psychologists, school nurses,
reading specialists, etc. In re Coutant, 2 EDUc. DEP'T REP. 53 (N.Y. 1961).
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hearing" in order to obtain dismissal.3 In contrast, probationary employment is regarded as a testing period during which an employer
can evaluate on-the-job performance in contemplation of future, permanent appointment, and does not carry with it the benefit of guaranteed
4
due process prior to termination.
The requirement of a testing period is not, in most instances, unreasonable. It is in the interest of the state that its employees be competent, and the period during which civil servants are kept in suspense
as to the permanence of a job while their competency is being assessed
is generally very short.; Furthermore, since most probationary employees have not had to meet any requirements in terms of educational or moral suitability prior to hiring,6 it is reasonable that some
time be allowed for an employee to prove himself by performance on
the job, or on required examinations, and for an employer to make a
determination on permanent employability.
Although the tentative quality of probationary employment and
its accompanying procedural framework are defensible and just in
relation to many civil service jobs, they are eminently unjust for probationary teachers, who differ from other civil servants in several significant ways. School districts are prohibited from hiring teachers who
do not possess a teaching certificate or a diploma from a teachers' college.7 This requirement immediately removes teachers from the gen3. The procedure requires that the teacher be apprised of the charges against
him and that there be a hearing at which those charges may be refuted with witnesses
and evidence. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1973).
4. The purpose of the civil service probationary period is to give appointing authorities an opportunity to appraise the employee's ability, and to give the employee an
opportunity to prove himself capable of performing the job. Sanchez v. Town of Brookhaven, 232 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 864, 245 N.Y.S.2d 994

(2d Dep't 1963). See also Ramos v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 34
925, 311 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1st Dep't 1970); Howard v. Kross, 24 Misc.
N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Croft v. McGinnis, 24 Misc. 2d 235, 196
(Sup. Ct. 1959); Edell v. Municipal Broadcasting Sys., 9 Misc. 2d 220,

App. Div. 2d
2d 973, 202
N.Y.S.2d 115
169 N.Y.S.2d

993 (Sup. Ct. 1958).

5. N.Y. DEP'T OF CIV. SERv. RULES & REos. § 4.5(a) (1) (McKinney 1973) provides for a probationary term of "not less than eight nor more than 26 weeks."
6. Depending on the position to which an individual is appointed, there may or
may not have been required a competitive examination. No evidence of formal education is required, however.
7. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3001(2) (McKinney 1970). This law provides that only
"certified" persons are permitted to be employed. In practice, due to section 3604(6)
which permits the Commissioner of Education to excuse a qualification default, "uncertifled" persons are sometimes employed in the public schools. Therefore, the assertion that
teachers are to be possessed of a certificate or teachers' college diploma is only generally
valid.
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eral class of probationary state employees who, for the most part, are
not obliged to present any training certification.8 The period during
which teachers are on probation is five years 9-vastly longer than the
probationary term of any other civil servant. After an individual's
energies have been directed toward the same job for such time a considerable interest arises in continued employment; 10 that interest seems
deserving of procedural protection.
The relative strictness of the requirements which must be met
before the grant of a probationary teaching position and the extremely
long limbo-period of probation that is statutorily prescribed distinguish
teachers from other civil servants, and justify a statutorily sanctioned
pretermination hearing. It appears, however, that those distinctions
were only partially responsible for the brouhaha raised by teachers and
their supporters who demanded fair dismissal legislation, and were in
no discernible way the impetus which moved the New York legislature to respond to those demands.
B. The Teacher's Quandary
A view of the current position of teachers in relation to employing
school boards and their communities reveals that teachers have been,
and still are, considerably more susceptible to unjustified dismissal than
most other civil servants. It is important at this stage to emphasize the
word "unjustified." Favoring pretermination procedural safeguards in
no way reflects advocacy of the premise that once a teacher has succeeded in securing a job he should retain that job regardless of the
caliber of service subsequently rendered. But attention must be paid to
the fact that teachers, however capably they perform in the classroom,
are in an extraordinarily vulnerable position, since their opinions and
life-styles are exposed to daily scrutiny. Any untoward comment or unconventional activity is fodder for the local gossip mill. One parent who
disapproves of any teacher for whatever reason, may be able to rally
opinion against the teacher simply by raising a "that person is teaching
8. See note 6 supra.
9. See N.Y. EDUc. LAw §§ 2509(1)(a), 2573(1)(a), 3012(1)(a), 3013(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
10. During this five year period a probationer might have established a family
and become very firmly rooted in his community and school settings. The spouse might
be employed in the area. To force a probationer to pull up roots and make a new
start elsewhere, without affording him the opportunity for a hearing, is extremely unfair.

831
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our children" racket. Community pressure is easily aroused when the
question is one involving their young children, and a board of education, subject to periodic election," is responsive to such pressure. The
issue before a board can quickly be transformed from the detached
legal inquiry, "[D]oes this teacher's behavior justify dismissal?," to the
emotionally charged, "Does community feeling necessitate dismissal?"
The result is that local sentiment can railroad a teacher out of a job,
regardless of professional competence, and without due regard being
paid to justly dealing with the teacher. Clearly, this community pressure does not have equivalent potential harm for other civil servants,
2
who are not exposed to constant public examination.1
The recommendations in this Comment are made with a mind
toward fostering the best possible education for public school students.
That goal can only be achieved by maintaining faculties of well-qualified, creative, resourceful and inspiring teachers. Young, high quality
teachers, in turn, can only be attracted by guaranteeing fair pretermination procedures for probationary dismissals. Absent such procedures,
important problems remain unsolved. Top-notch educators, suffering
insecurity with regard to their employment status, often submit to
abridgement of their constitutional freedoms of speech and association in order to alleviate that insecurity. Additionally, excellent teachers, who are unwilling to submit to encroachments on their liberty,
are often lost to the students due to summary dismissal by unrestricted
boards. 13 The former issue concerns a reduction in the effectiveness of
teachers so inhibited, while the latter concerns the total loss of talents
valuable to the educational system. Pretermination procedures work
towards eliminating unjustified dismissals, and by extension aid in
overcoming the defects in public education which result from unconstitutionally interfering with effective teachers.
Two distinct factors have repeatedly prompted school authorities
to forego the continued services of talented teachers: (1) the desire
11. At one time the boards in Buffalo and Yonkers were appointed by the city's
mayor. But, by recent amendment, all cities in New York State except Yonkers are
now served by boards -chosen by the public in a general election. N.Y. EDUc. LAW
§ 2553 (McKinney Supp. 1973).

12. For example, the government employee, permanently employed, who is responsible for staffing an office with secretaries and clerks will probably not be exposed

to a pressure like that to which a school board is subject. Even if he were, it would not
have the influence on him that public opinion has on the periodically elected school
boards.
13. Matter of Worley, 1 Ed. Dep't Rep. 475, 477 (N.Y. 1960).
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to limit the number of teachers who attain tenured status, and (2)
the attempt to establish and maintain a faculty which accepts the
standards and authority of the district's administration.
1. Tenure. Schools are reluctant to award tenure because of the
rigorous statutory requirements 4 which must be met in dismissing an
incompetent tenured teacher. But there are also pressing economic
reasons for wanting to limit the number of tenure awards made in a
district. Teachers with tenure are entitled to a salary far in excess of
that which a young recent graduate of teachers' college can hope to
receive. 15 Schools boards, subject to budgetary limitations, must consider the salary factor when contemplating employing on a tenured
basis. 16
Economic pressure to avoid hiring persons who qualify for tenurescale salaries is intensified by the overwhelming size of the qualified,
unemployed, and frankly, cheaper labor pool comprised of nontenured
teachers. In most occupations today there is a plethora of able candidates for every available position, and in the teaching field the problem is notoriously severe.'. Dismissing a teacher poses no particular
problem for boards as scores of applications are received for each
opening.'8 Yearly, employers have their pick of the new crop of eager
14. Tenure carries with it the benefits of continued employment during good
behavior and competent and efficient service, strict definition of what comprises bad
(justly dismissable) behavior and the right to a hearing in case removal is sought. N.Y.
EDuc. LAw §§ 2509(2), 2573(5)-(6), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3020(a) (McKinney Supp.
1973).
15. Buder, In a Surplus Market, Teachers Wait, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at
39, col. 1.
16. A facile response to this problem is: "demand more state aid for schools." But,

before schools are granted more aid, consent for an increase in the state's allocation to
education must be obtained from the Albany legislature. Legislators are typically very

wary of taking steps likely to incur the disapproval of their constituents; increasing
taxes is an action for which voter disapproval is virtually guaranteed. To grant the

schools more state aid has very blatent "higher taxes" implications for the average
voter; it would be sure to arouse disapproval if not outright protest. Consequently,
legislators would be most circumspect about, and unlikely to respond favorably to, a

demand for an increased allocation of funds.
On the other hand, a bill (such as N.Y. EDuc.

LAw

§ 3031 (McKinney Supp.

1973)) which purports to be "fair," to accord citizens something rightfully theirs, is
generally viewed in a favorable light. A fair-dismissal law is the kind of legislation which

wins voter approbation, and this route is therefore one which voter-conscious legislators
are more prone to follow. After enactment, when the inevitable increase in tenured
personnel requires that the schools be allocated more money, the increase will by neces-

sity be forthcoming.
17. Buder, supra note 15, at 39.
18.

In New York City, for example, there are now more than 12,000 names
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young "certifieds," and are able to retain them at a lesser cost than
they can teachers who have been on the market for several years. The
economic disadvantage of employing someone entitled to the relatively
high tenured-teacher salary and the temptation posed by the vast number of bargain-priced applicants frequently induces the discharge of
experienced teachers and the hiring of those fresh out of school.
2. The Nonconforming or Dissident Teacher. Dismissals may
also be motivated by a desire to stifle teacher activity, both in and
outside the classroom, which smacks of opposition to the board's policies or which appears to denigrate community mores. These activities
might be of a political nature 9 or involve a teacher's personal moral
philosophy. 20 But, irrespective of the nature of the activity, dismissal of
a teacher for any of these reasons clearly raises serious first amendment
questions. Fifty years ago, courts, without exception, refused to intervene in this area, deeming it to be one of state concern. Since then,
however, a series of important cases have made various inroads on
that stance.21 Today, if a teacher can demonstrate that his first amendon eligibility lists for teaching jobs. Some candidates have been waiting for appointments for two years or longer. In the face of such a great demand for
jobs, the system actually made fewer appointments and assignments this falla total of 5,131-than in any year since 1967, when there was still a shortage
of teachers....
According to national estimates, there will be more than twice as many
prospective teachers coming out of college this year as there will be starting jobs
available.
Id.
19. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972) ; see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
20. The case of Mrs. X was referred to the New York State United Teachers [hereinafter referred to as NYSUT] for their attention. The woman, whose "files and evaluations [had] been excellent with zero problems" had apparently been carrying on an affair
with her ex-principal. Upon his departure, the supervising principal self-righteously informed Mrs. X of her dismissal. Originally the dismissal was justified on the grounds
that Mrs. X was not certified. The fact that she was certified elicited the following
reasons for discharge: "I . . . feel it is my duty to find someone who is better qualified . . . ." Memorandum from James Dockery to James Conti, Apr. 16, 1973. A more
conventional case involving the morality issue is found in Jarvey v. Martin, 336 F. Supp.
1350 (W.D. Va. 1972), in which a professor at a public institution was denied a salary
increase because he had published a letter in Redbook praising an article on premarital
sex and expressing his intent to use the author's comments in class. See also Russo v.
Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
Mrs. Russo's declining to repeat the pledge of allegiance was a political act precipitated
by her personal moral standards. For another example of politics cum morals that subjected a New York teacher to unconstitutional punishment, see James v. Board of Educ.,
461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
21. This development has been very effectively traced in Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuxE L.J. 841 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Van Alstyne].
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ment rights have been infringed and that free exercise of those rights
would not have obstructed the interest "of the state, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees,"2 2 courts will affirm the teacher's right to exercise of
23
first amendment freedoms.

C. The Court Response
The willingness of courts to offer this protection was won by arguments which invoked the goals of the educational process, and the
nature of the teacher's role within that process. Proponents of stronger
protection pointed out that the salient objective of education is to convey to students the ability to learn, and keep learning, 24 and that it is
the teacher's lot to accomplish this objective.
Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by the
very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of
open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble
task if the conditions for2 5 the practice of a responsible and critical
mind are denied to them.
These remarks by Justice Frankfurter reflect support for an ancient
concept which has been central to the argument for greater protection
of the teaching community-academic freedom.
The roots of academic freedom can be traced to the writings of
the Greek pedagogue, Socrates, but its common acceptance is first
found in the twelfth century, contemporaneous with the establishment
of universities. 26 For most individuals, a job is totally independent of
22. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
23. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Weinan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
24. On the objectives of education, see, e.g., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE:
A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (L. Joughin
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]; HERITAGE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 423525 (P. Gross ed. 1962); F. MAYER, AMERICAN IDEAS AND EDUCATION (1964); M.
MILSTEIN & R. JENNINGS, EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE
-THE
NEW YoRK EXPERIENCE (1973) [hereinafter cited as MILSTEIN & JENNINGS];
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON EDUCATIoN-A MILESTONE FOR EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

(1965); Report of the Conference on Educational Priorities, The Learning Society: Institutions to Integrate Work and Education, in THE FUTURE OF WORK 114, 115 (F.
Best ed. 1973).
25. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26. R. HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE 3 (1961).
Concerning the history of academic freedom, see R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
OUR TIME (1955); W. METZGER, ACADBMC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY
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private thoughts and spoken opinions. In contrast, a teacher's work,
which involves the pursuit and conveyance of knowledge, is composed
entirely of thought and speech. Impinging on a teacher's constitutionally guaranteed freedom of belief and expression impedes the
teaching process itself, and consequently obstructs learning.
It is not from purely selfish motives, then, that teachers demand
guarantees of academic freedom and personal liberty. These demands
are made, rather, in the broader interest of effective education and
intellectual progress. 7 An educator must be allowed to question,
probe, and dissect the world around him. To deny him the assurance
that his job will not be jeopardized by pursuit of knowledge is tantamount to forbidding effective performance. As one court noted:
[C]onsiderations which militate in favor of academic freedom [are]
our historical commitment to free speech for all, the peculiar importance of academic freedom to the progress of society, the need that
both teacher and student operate in an atmosphere of open inquiry,
feeling always free to challenge and improve established ideas ....

28

These pressing considerations have convinced courts that the judiciary
should protect academic freedom. When petitioned today, if abridgement of a teacher's first amendment rights is proven, courts respond,
invoking the concept of academic freedom, to vigilantly guard the
civil liberties of teachers.
In view of this positive court response the necessity for stronger
statutory protection might well be questioned. Enactment of an effective statute is deemed necessary, however, because of the impracticality
and inherent inadequacy of court action. A court challenge carries
with it many disadvantages and offers little in the way of possible
affirmative relief. Taking a grievance to court is necessarily an afterthe-fact solution which requires an arduous, drawn-out, uphill battle.
Proof of constitutional infringement is difficult, and the teacher has
the burden of establishing it.29
(1961). General commentary on academic freedom is found in HANDDOOx; Frakt, NonTenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 27 (1969); Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure:" Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W. REs. L.

RFv. 475 (1971); Van Alstyne.
27. See, e.g, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
28. Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
29. When a hearing has not been allowed prior to commencement
tion the teacher is further handicapped by the absence of an established
which to build his case.

Keyisbian v.
(1960).
of court acrecord from
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Faculty members are not litigious by nature, the costs of formal controversy are high and usually must be borne personally ... and the
ordinary case may not reach judgment for months or even years
after the plaintiff has been separated from his job. In addition, the
teacher must face the practical recognition that the extralegal hazards of such litigation are themselves quite great: to sue and to lose
establishes a public record against oneself as a teacher . . . [t]o sue
and to win will not permit one actually to resume teaching at the in-

stitution in most instances, and it will almost certainly spread upon the
public record whatever evidence of the plaintiff's shortcomings the
defending institution can muster .... 30

In view of the undesirability of court action, the fact that any teachers
have gone to court to challenge their dismissal is surprising; it suggests
the gravity of the problems which teachers face, and serves to emphasize the lack of effective alternative solutions. The ineffectiveness of
post-termination court remedies, in conjunction with the indefeasibility of academic freedom, dictates the conclusion that effective protection of teachers' rights is necessary, and that such protection critically depends on the availability of pretermination procedural due
process. 3 '
D. The Legislative Response
Sometimes it is easy to determine what factors most immediately
motivate enactment of legislation. When there is very widespread
and sharply divided public interest in a cause; when legislators, in
30. Van Alstyne 859-60. The plight of Susan Cook Russo, detailed sympathetically
in Lang, Love of Country, NEw YORKER, July 30, 1973, at 35; Breasted, A Teacher's
Fight for Right To Shun Pledge to the Flag, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 27, col. 6,
demonstrates the hardships which beset one who bitterly, albeit successfully, pursues an
employment grievance in court, Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973). The matter was in litigation for three years.
During that period Mrs. Russo applied for a position in every school district in the
Rochester area, but to no avail. Some interviewers were frank in their reasons for not
hiring her, others disdained to offer explanation, but it was evident that she had, in
effect, been blacklisted in her chosen profession. She eventually won her case and was
awarded $20,000 damages. By a subsequent court order she was reinstated by the
district which had fired her. It is important to remember that Mrs. Russo was not
teaching for three years. During that time she had to resort to working in a factory,
labor to which someone of her training was hardly suited. The only remedy a court
has to offer Mrs. Russo for those three years is a sum of money. The inadequacy of
that solution is revealed by Mrs. Russo's remark, "I don't deserve to be punished. I
want to teach." Lang, supra, at 48. Disclaimer: Although sporting the same last name,
the author of Love of Country and this Comment are neither one and the same person,
nor related.
31. Van Alstyne 860.
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one way or another, are forced to take a public stand on an issue;
when newspapers pick up on a story; or when the rationale for a piece
of legislation is formally issued at the time a bill is passed, one can
easily isolate the various pressures felt by legislators, and confidently
cite motivating factors. The intentions of the lawmakers who enacted
section 3031, however, are not easily identified. In passage section 3031
was not accompanied by any memorandum indicating its intended
purpose, and there is nothing which categorically, and with official
authorization, outlines the goal of the statute. Consequently, in order
to deduce the factors which motivated passage of the statute and the
functions the law was intended to fulfill, one must examine the surrounding circumstances, the sources of pressure which are recognized
as affecting legislators' actions, and finally, the language of section
3031 itself.
1. Lobbying Efforts. One of the forces traditionally recognized as
influencing legislators is the "lobby." The New York State Teachers
Association8 2 was the only organized group which actively sought passage of a fair-dismissal law33 Their memorandum on the subject, 84 reproduced in part below offers an accurate assessment of the legal situation confronting probationary teachers prior to the addition of section
3031 to article 61 of New York's Education Law. It is here relevant
as evidence of the information to which legislators were exposed when
considering the proposed bill, and which, conceivably, influenced them
to respond to "the teachers' quandary."
While the statutes contain no express language relative to the
furnishing of reasons for such dismissal, it has been established by
court decisions that, although teachers cannot be dismissed for reasons
which infringe upon their constitutional or statutory rights, they are
nevertheless not entitled to be informed of the reasons for their dismissal. This state of the law has undermined the effectiveness of the
constitutional and statutory rights of probationary teachers .... This
situation has given rise to many abuses-teachers dismissed for organizational activity, for unpopular political or other beliefs, and for other
unjust causes.., manifestly arbitrary or capricious.85
32. NYSTA has since merged with the United Teachers of New York to become
NYSUT. Their merger in 1972 set a precedent since it was the first time a professional state teachers' association united with a labor union in United States history.
MILSTEIN & JENNINGS 130.

33. Interview with Paul Broome, Field Staff NYSUT, in Williamsville, N.Y., Oct.

12, 1973.
34. 1972 Nzw YORK
35. Id. at 112.

STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 111.
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Although lobbying groups are frequently instrumental in passing
legislation 36 the effect of this teachers' association on the New York
legislature with respect to section 3031 was probably minimal. NYSTA
has been ineffective on issues of even greater significance to their members than dismisssal procedure, For instance, despite the Association's
best pressure efforts, the probationary period for teachers was very
recently increased on an across-the-board basis. Previously probation
was a non-specific period which varied between one and five years
from one district to the next (within statutory provisions for various
types of school districts); the exact period being determined at the
discretion of the local board.3 7 Currently a uniform five-year probationary period is in force. In seeking to isolate the probable reasons
for legislative action on this issue, therefore, it would be naive to
place much emphasis on lobbying activity.
2. General Public Opinion. In contrast, the temperament of the
public, another of the pressure-sources to which legislators are traditionally deemed sensitive, appears to have been a significant factor
motivating passage of section 3031.
The young teachers were not alone in the conviction that probationary employment requires procedural protection. Professor Van
Alstyne found that there was an increased acceptance of and support
for that position in the American Association of University Professors,
an organization "very much influenced by considerations of quality
control," and in which there is a high proportion of staid senior faculty members. 8 Other classes of workers had also made a due process
argument in seeking to protect their employment as a property right.3 9
The prevalence and strength of trade unions in America attests to a
widely held belief that employment and its concomitant rights (fair
36. Indeed, it has been stated:
Mhe power of the vote can be a highly potent influencing mechanism for educational interest groups. Labor, as an interest group, is most able to use this
mechanism because its membership is quite broad and its affiliated groups
e.g., members' families and their friends) [sic] are large in number. Educational
interest groups can also be important vote getters, however, and legislators
seem to be increasingly aware of this in New York State.
MILSTEIN & JENNINGS 94.

37. The old statutory terms are presented and interpreted in Comment, New York
BUFFALO L. REV.
815 (1967).
38. Van Alstyne 874.
39. See Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV.
1081 (1973).

Administrative Procedure for the Dismissal of Teaching Personnel, 16
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wages, humane hours, fringe benefits) require protection. In short,
there was widespread support for the amorphous concept of fair employment practices in general and fair dismissal procedures in particular.
Even without its being organized, an opinion widely held by
voters carries considerable weight with legislators who must run for
office every two years. Russell Baker's sarcastic, but apt, description of
the raison d'tre of the federal House of Representatives may be applied with equal validity to the New York legislature: "[It] exists
largely for the purpose of getting re-elected. Anything that endangers
the process of getting re-elected is commonly regarded in the House
of Representatives as a threat to the American Republic." 40 Thus widespread support for protection of employment might well have influenced lawmakers considering a fair-dismissal bill.
3. Imminence of Supreme Court Action. The factor which most
affected legislators, however, was their belief that pretermination procedural due process was about to be judicially mandated on the federal
level. 41- Prior to section 3031's enactment virtually every circuit in the
federal court system had ruled on the issue of nontenured teachers'
substantive rights.4 Legal scholars who considered the panoply of
divergent holdings recognized that within the various state statutory
schemes too many situations could arise which would justify a teacher's suspicions that termination was predicated on reasons invalid under the Bill of Rights. 43 Taking into account the prevailing confusion
various analysts called for, and predicted, the imminent advent of a
federally declared right to pretermination proceedings. 44 Hot on the
heels of these scholars' evaluations, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in two teacher dismissal cases-Board of Education

6.

40. Baker, The House Is a Home, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at

41. Again, due to the dearth of authoritative material on the subject, this can
only be stated to be the major factor by inference. But, in the opinion of Emanuel
Tabachnik, attorney for the Buffalo Teachers Federation and retained counsel for
NYSUT of the 8th Judicial District, it was, to the exclusion of all other forces, the
causative one. Interview with Emanuel Tabachnik, in Buffalo, N.Y., Nov. 27, 1973.
42. See Comment, Probationary Public School Teachers and Procedural Due
Process: Is a Hearing Useful?-Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 1971 UTAH L.
REv.573, 574-75.
43. Frakt, supra note 26, at 27; Pettigrew, supra note 26, at 475; Comment, supra
note 42; Note, Non-Tenured Teachers and Due Process: The Right to a Hearing and
Statement of Reasons, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. Rav. 100 (1972). See generally Van Alstyne.
44. E.g., Van Alystne 870.
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v. Roth45 and Perry v. Sindermann4 6---which were expected to be the
vehicles for the anticipated declaration of that right.
At the time the New York legislature was considering a bill
which proposed fair-dismissal procedures for teachers, the general public supported strong protection of employment. At the same time, federal decisions, from the Scopes "Monkey Trial" of the 1920's to the
most recent pronouncements, 4 7 revealed a definite judicial movement
toward safeguarding teachers' rights. Also, legal experts were calling
for protection and the Supreme Court added the crowning touch by
agreeing to hear the Roth and Sindermann arguments. With the additional incentives of becoming one of the first states to act on the issue,
and also being able to go on record in favor of a bill which, it was
argued, would improve the quality of public education, 48 both houses
of New York's legislature approved the bill and section 3031 became
law.
II. ANALYSIS OF SECrION 3031
The new statute reads:
§ 3031. Procedure when tenure not to be granted at conclusion
of probationary period or when services to be discontinued. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter and except in cities
having a population of one million or more, boards of education
and boards of cooperative educational services shall review all recommendations not to appoint a person on tenure, and, teachers employed
on probation by any school district or by any board of cooperative
educational services, as to whom a recommendation is to be made that
appointment on tenure not be granted or that their services be discontinued shall, at least thirty days prior to the board meeting at
which such recommendation is to be considered, be notified of such
intended recommendation and the date of the board meeting at
which it is to be considered. Such teacher may, not later than twentyone days prior to such meeting, request in writing that he be furnished
45. 404 U.S. 989 (1971) (granting cert.).
46. 404 U.S. 934 (1971) (granting cert.).
47. See note 21 supra.
48. Legislators, as most people, will generally assert that they support the cause of
improved education, since it is both popular and uncontroversial. More New York
legislators consider themselves experts on educational legislative issues than on any
other area (38 out of 117 respondents in a recently conducted survey indicated education as an area of legislative expertise, the next most frequently indicated area was
local government with only 14 respondents choosing it). MILSTEIN & JENNINGS 46.
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with a written statement giving the reasons for such recommendation and within seven days thereafter such written statement shall be
furnished. Such teacher may file a written response to such statement
with the district clerk not later than seven days prior to the date of
the board meeting.
This section shall not be construed as modifying existing law
with respect to the rights of probationary teachers or the powers and
duties of boards of education or boards of cooperative educational
services, with respect to the discontinuance of services of teachers
49
or appointments on tenure of teachers.
At first the enactment of section 3031 was greeted with enthusiasm. Teachers, convinced that their interest would be protected by a
statute which everyone described as "The Fair Dismissal Law," were
placated. 50 New York, being among the first states to approve legislation in the area of fair-dismissal for probationers, was praised for its
legislature's "admirable efforts . . . to afford protection."6 1 Unfortunately, when the statute's provisions are viewed in context with the
rest of New York's statutory scheme12 and with the interpretations
49. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3031 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
50. So placated were they that some never bothered to apprise themselves of the
statute's actual provisions, and consequently allowed the time limitations to run. They
were then unable to obtain a list of reasons, or to file a response prior to their hearing. A goodly number of the probationers dismissed during the first year of the statute's
effect found themselves in this situation. Interview with Paul Broome, supra note 33.
51. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 628 n.6, cert. denied, 411 U.S.
932 (1973).
52. The following schedule of procedures integrates section 3031 into the remainder
of the relevant state statutory scheme. It delineates, from hiring to discontinuance of
services, New York's legislatively created procedure pertaining to the employ of probationary teachers.
a) If appointed by a school district the probationary term is for five years. N.Y.
EDUc. LAW §§ 2509(1)(a), 2573(1)(a), 3012(l)(a), 3013(1)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1973). BOCES appointments are to a term not to exceed five years. Id. § 3014(1)
(McKinney 1970). In the case of a city district substitute teacher being appointed to a
full-time position, the probationary term may be shortened. Id. §§ 2509(1) (a), 2573
(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
b) A probationer may be discontinued during the prescribed probationary period
on the recommendation of the district superintendent by a majority of the board of
education or BOCES. Id. §§ 2509(1)(a), 2573(1)(a), 3014(1) (McKinney 1970).
c) Sixty days prior to termination of the probationary teacher who will not be recommended for tenure, the teacher must be given notice by the superintendent that there
will be a recommendation against granting tenured appointment. Id. §§ 2509(1) (a),
2573(l)(a), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
d) Thirty days prior to the board meeting which is to review this recommendation, or one suggesting discontinuance during the probationary term, the teacher must
be informed of the "intended recommendation" and the date of the board meeting. Id.
§ 3031.
e) The teacher, in writing, may request a written statement of reasons for the ad-
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made of section 3031's provisions by district superintendents, boards
of education, and the Commissioner of Education himself, the enthusiasm seems unwarranted. The following analysis of section 3031's inadequacies, and those of the existing alternatives to its provisions, will
demonstrate the necessity for a more comprehensive and effective action by the New York legislature.
The weakness of section 3031 must be attributed to its lack of
specificity. The statute requires that the superintendent furnish reasons
for a dismissal recommendation to the teacher who has been astute
enough to request them within the prescribed time period; but, the
reasons thus furnished are not specifically required to be just, constitutional or exact. The teacher's right to "file a response" exists in a
void as to the question of what effect, once filed, a response will have
on the reviewing board. It is not dear from section 3031's language
whether the reviewers are even required to look at the "response."
The interest of equitably examining the entire situation makes the
ability of a teacher to present evidence in person and to call witnesses
pivotal to completely informing the board of the facts in the case.
The legislature has failed to outline standards for the required review, leaving procedure solely within the boards' discretion. No power
has been created in the reviewing board that would enable it to override a superintendent's recommendation against granting tenure,a
This raises questions of whether the board's determinations are to be
given effect; questions for which section 3031's provisions provide no
answers.
Under section 3031 there is no guarantee that the reasons supplied to the teacher in support of negative recommendation are either
accurate or even a "good faith" explanation of the basis for discontinuing services. These failures nullify any positive effects which
might have resulted from a teacher having, in hand, documentation
for prospective employers of bona fide reasons for discharge.
verse recommendation. The request must be made at least 21 days prior to the
scheduled board meeting. Id.
f) That statement will be furnished within seven days. Id.
g) The teacher may file a written response with the district clerk not later than
seven days prior to the board meeting. Id.
53. The reviewers are unable to grant tenure because tenured appointment is, by
statute, only to be attained on the recommendation of the superintendent. Id. §§ 2509(2),
2573(5), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2). This fact increases one's doubts as to the effectiveness of section 3031. For Department of Education rulings on this point, see notes
54-62 infra.
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Finally, aside from the review which is required, all procedures
established by section 3031 can be activated by the teacher only, and
must be invoked within strict time limitations-if a teacher does not
respond to the notification of dismissal recommendation with a timely
request for "reasons," he will not be provided "reasons"; lacking such,
he is obviously prevented from filing a "response."
Section 3031, then, is just the barebones skeleton of a statute. All
that teachers are assured is that dismissal recommendations will be
reviewed. Numerous important considerations relevant to the review
remain unspecified. Admittedly, lack of specificity does not, ipso facto,
vitiate a statute; but, in the case of section 3031, there are two very
significant additional factors which do render its provisions useless.
First of all, the bodies assigned to conduct reviews are the local
board of education, or BOCES, hardly to be characterized as disinterested tribunals. They are, in effect, the teacher's employers and as
such are considerably more likely to sympathize with the superintendent, their employee-supervisor, than with the teacher who has
questioned the accepted norms of the school and perhaps the community. The fact that school boards are elected by the public gives community standards added weight, and puts the teacher who challenges
them at further disadvantage.
The other factor which renders section 3031's review "useless" is
the restrictive interpretation of the statute espoused by Commissioner
of Education Nyquist6 4 If administering forces were willing to accede
to a liberal application of the new law, probationers could conceivably
enjoy very adequate protection. However, examination of recent Department of Education rulings on the proper application of section
3031 reveals that no such liberal interpretation is in the offing.55
Commissioner Nyquist defends section 3031 against charges of
total uselessness by distinguishing the teacher who is denied tenure
from one who is recommended for dismissal during the course of his
probationary term.56 In the former situation he asserts that the board
is powerless to grant tenure absent the superintendent's approval,
54. In re Delaney, No. 8723 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Oct. 3, 1973); In re McGrath,

No. 8699 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973); In re Waterman, No. 8714 (N.Y.
Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973).

55. E.g., In re Waterman, No. 8714 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973)
(in which Nyquist strongly stated that the superintendent's recommendation is absolutely
necessary to effect tenure conferral).

56. Id.
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while in the latter case the board may act to dismiss or retain a
teacher regardless of the superintendent's position. 57 To Nyquist this
distinction indicates that a valuable right has been conferred to midterm probationers by section 303 I's provisions:
[W]hen a superintendent recommends dismissal of a teacher during
the probationary period, a board of education may accept or reject the
recommendation of the superintendent. In . . . [that] situation, the
opportunity to present a refutation of a recommendation of dismissal
is a valuable right, of which a probationary teacher may not be
deprived.58
The right to refute a dismissal recommendation (a right section
3031 purports to extend to all untenured teachers) "only takes on
value when the board which receives the recommendation is empowered to act on it." 59 Due to the language of other sections of the
Education Law,60 one could conclude that the value of that right is
denied teachers who have completed the five years of probation. The
Commissioner has opted for this restrictive interpretation, the result
being that by administrative decision section 3031's right of refutation
only benefits midterm probationers. Having thus limited the group
potentially enjoying refutation benefits, Nyquist then cites the remainder of that "valuable right" in order to vindicate section 3031's
usefulness. Since there are many serious weaknesses in other of the
new law's provisions, this limited refutation privilege only confers a
vestige of benefit. Furthermore, the Commissioner is being inexcusably
nearsighted when he tries to cite that vestigial right as an intentional
award to one particular group of probationers. Legislators do not harbor feelings of generosity for midterm probationers beyond those they
57. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Roth (see notes 19 & 20 supra),
made a similar distinction and concluded that rights to due process attach only when the
administrative action being taken conflicts with a preexisting contract-like guarantee.
408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). Thus, if a board attempts to dismiss a probationer midterm,
the preexisting understanding that the teacher would serve for the entire probationary
period entitles that teacher to a hearing on the proposed dismissal. Stewart's analysis
fails because of his assumption that the only rights which a court can act upon are
contractual in the most traditional and narrow sense. It seems oppressively restrictive
to make the rights of liberty and property depend on bargained-for agreements. Such
fundamental interests should be accorded constitutional protection, and not depend
solely on the relative strengths of the bargaining parties.
58. In re McGrath, No. 8699 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973).
59. In re Waterman, No. 8714 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973).
60. N.Y. EDUc. LAw §§ 2509(2), 2573(5), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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have for teachers who have completed probation. There is no rational
reason for granting a "valuable right" to one group while denying
that same right to the other. Nyquist's attempt to show that some
positive right has been conferred by section 3031 fails; his distinction
merely reveals another defect in the statute: the new law is inconsistent with the basic premises of the Education Law as a whole. 0 ' Because it is unreasonable to presume that the legislators intentionally
favored some probationers with a right which they denied to others,
one can only assume that the inconsistency results from an oversight:
the legislators forgot to provide comparable nullifying language for
the refutation right in midterm probationers.0 2
Whatever forces actually prevailed upon the legislature to enact
a fair-dismissal law, the statute, as it was written and subsequently
interpreted, alleviates none of the problems which those agitating for
passage of fair-dismissal measures sought to solve. It is thus not surprising that advocates of teachers' rights have abandoned section 3031
as "useless" and continue to strive for stronger protective measures.
III. THE SITUATION TODAY
A. Generally
In view of section 3031's ineffectiveness, other means of improving
the teachers' situation vis4-vis unjust dismissal are being pursued by
teachers and their allies, such as NYSUT. 63 These alternative routes,
however, appear equally inadequate.
61. One such premise would be the Education Law's definition of a board's function and power regarding teacher-status.
62. A perverse picture of legislators results if one interprets the statute as intentionally awarding rights to the midterm probationer that are specifically denied to
other, as yet untenured, teachers. From such an intent one must infer a calculated policy
which enables a board to allow, even encourage, teachers to serve out the full five years
of probation when that same board is powerless to guarantee employment after that
period. It would be a sanction to boards who wish to take advantage of cheap probationary labor.
63. Mr. Broome characterized section 3031 as "virtually useless." He emphasized
the nonspecificity of the statute, particularly regarding the "reasons" to which teachers
are entitled. The following quotes are excerpted from "reasons" which were provided
to teachers (who had, uniformly, good evaluations of their classroom effectiveness) pursuant to section 3031 requests. They demonstrate how the statute's failure to require
"justness" of the reasons produced for teachers has resulted in superintendents providing
only ridiculous rationales for recommendations against teachers. "This administration
feels it h4s the opportunity to upgrade the levels of teacher competency due to the
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First, the teacher's union intends to challenge the constitutionality of section 3031 with "test cases."' 64 NYSUT also plans to seek
insurance of just dismissals by negotiating for fair-dismissal clauses in
employment contracts on a district-by-district basis. The Union's efforts in this area, combined with those of local negotiators, have
achieved varying degrees of success. The negotiators define success in
terms of the relative "strength" of the agreement's language. 65 Regardless of "strength," however, a provision's effectiveness ultimately de-

pends on the good faith of the district agreeing to dismiss "fairly."
Commissioner Nyquist has repeatedly, and adamantly, held that termi-

nation of the services of a probationary teacher is not properly the
subject of negotiation. 66 Consequently, when a board which has agreed

to dismiss only for "just cause" does not exercise good faith in execution of the agreement, an aggrieved teacher is once again left only

the feckless remedy of court action to protect his rights.
Even if it could be assumed that boards would honor the contractual fair-dismissal clause, a teacher unwilling to compromise his

principles might seriously object to being forced to rely on this means
tremendous availability of good teachers." Memorandum from John C. Berkhoudt to
James Conti, Apr. 16, 1973. "Your performance does not meet the degree of excellence
we are striving for . . . . Your performance . . . has not been what . . . the Board
would consider outstanding." Memorandum from James Dockery to James Conti, Apr.
16, 1973. Interview with Paul Broome, supra note 33. Commissioner Nyquist himself
takes note of the failure of section 3031 to prescribe the specificity necessary in the required reasons, and has ruled that some reasons given are too vague. In re McGrath,
No. 8699 (N.Y. Dep't of Educ., Sept. 10, 1973).
64. Interview with Paul Broome, supra note 33. In light of the Supreme Court
decisions in Roth and Sindermann, a constitutional challenge of section 3031 would
appear to be doomed to failure.
65. An example of a strong clause reads: "No professional staff member tenured
or nontenured covered by this contract shall be reduced in rank or dismissed without
just cause." Contract between Griffith Institute and Central School Board of Education and Griffith Institute and Central School Faculty Association § 5.51 (effective
Sept. 1, 1972-Aug. 31, 1973) (emphasis added). Another example considered "strong"
by NYSUT: "Release of probationary teachers during the first three (3) years of the
probationary period [which is five years] shall not be subject to challenge. The release
of teachers after the third year of the probationary period without cause may be subject to the grievance procedure.' Negotiated Agreement Clarence School District &
Clarence Teachers Association §§ 15.02-.03 (effective July 30, 1973-June 30, 1975)
(emphasis added) (section headings omitted).
66.
The broad power conferred upon Boards of Education to consider and evaluate
the record of probationary teachers was conferred for the protection of the
student. As a matter of law and of sound public policy, a board may not contract away such a prerogative.
In re Collins, 9 Educ. Dep't Rep. 52 (N.Y. 1969), See also In ie Marsh, 8 Educ. Dep't
Rep. 165 (N.Y. 1969).
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of protection. For one who believes that all teachers should be accorded a right to pretermination due process, since its absence
jeopardizes academic freedom, the only supportable means of securing
such "due process" is through legislative decree. Relegating the question of dismissal procedure to the bargaining table amounts to an admission that academic freedom is not a right that ought to be accorded all teachers. Rather it is equivalent to wages: a benefit which
teachers may demand, and, depending on the strength of their bargaining position, might succeed in obtaining. This concession is one
which teachers simply should not have to make.
B. Position of Federal Courts
It will be recalled that, just prior to the enactment of section
3031, it was generally believed that the Supreme Court would soon announce that all teachers are entitled to some form of constitutionally
compelled pre-dismissal procedure 7-- that a property interest would
be held to exist in teachers' employment. The fourteenth amendment
due process issue was appropriately raised in Roth and Sindermann.
To the delight of those awaiting a favorable ruling on the question,
the Court granted certiorariin both cases.
In the first suit David Roth, a political science professor, brought
an action in district court challenging his non-retention by the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh. He had been hired for the fixed term of one
academic year and was not offered another year's employment. Roth
claimed that the university's action was an infringement of his first
amendment right to freedom of speech; furthermore, the absence of
notice of reasons for non-retention, and denial of an opportunity for
review on the issue of his employment status, was violative of his
fourteenth amendment right to due process. The Supreme Court
limited itself to the due process question" of whether there had been
a deprivation of life, liberty or property. In a notably unconvincing
opinion it was held that the failure to rehire Roth could not be characterized as deprivation of liberty because his ability to seek other
employment had not been impaired;6 9 furthermore, the Court found
67. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
68. The district court had stayed proceedings on his allegations concerning freedom of speech.
69. 408 U.S. at 575.
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the teacher's "concern" for being rehired did not amount to a fourteenth amendment "property interest." 70 In view of the evidence marshalled above which shows that dismissal does impair one's ability to
find future employment, and in light of the strong arguments in favor
of an employment property right, the Court's summary pronounce-,
ments in Roth, fortified by neither tangible evidence nor persuasive
logic, take on an aura of arbitrariness which demeans the United
States' highest court of justice.71
In Sindermann the respondent had been employed as a professor
by the state for ten consecutive years under a series of short term
contracts. He received neither notice of reasons for dismissal nor opportunity to be heard on the question of his non-retention. The same
constitutional arguments were raised as in Roth. But here the Court
determined that Sindermann's ten years of employment comprised
evidence of a "de facto" tenure system which earned him the right to
procedural due process. While vindicating Mr. Sindermann, this ruling has only a very limited potential application, and has no bearing on
the probationer's situation. According to the Court the only rights a
teacher has are those arising from his contract, 72 a position which relegates protection of academic freedom to the bargaining table.
The rulings in these two cases were acutely disappointing (Roth
in its entirety, and Sindermann in its narrowness), particularly so
because they were wholly unexpected. The Court destroyed hopes for
even minimal uniform protection of probationers' rights and reaffirmed'
the old formula: non-retention must be shown, on a case-by-case basis,
to have caused harm before a court may intervene on behalf of a
plaintiff.
The majority professed sympathy for the plight of teachers but
declined to require procedures that would mitigate teachers' problems. Properly conducted pretermination hearings would clearly reduce the possibility that a teacher might be harmed by non-retention.
The "sympathetic" Court was careful to state that their refusal to
70. Id. at 578.

71. In direct contradiction of this aspect of the Roth decision is the persuasive
holding of Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1970):
"[T]he interests of the non-tenured teacher in knowing the basis for his non-retention
are so substantial .

.

. as to require a written explanation in some detail .

with access to evaluation reports in the teacher's personnel file."

.

. together

72. The word "contract" is not meant to connote "formal written agreement" here,

but is to be understood in its broadest sense, as encompassing all aspects of the contracting parties' relationship.
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mandate such procedures, "in no way indicated a view that an oppor-'
tunity for a hearing or a statement of reasons would, or would not,
be appropriate or wise." 78 A reading of the fourteenth amendment and
the case law surrounding it reveals that an interest in liberty or property, no matter how minimal, merits some kind of procedural due
process protection.7 4 The Court abdicated its responsibility under the
Constitution by refusing to protect the rights of nontenured teachers
and relegating the duty of protection to state legislatures, school boards
and unions to provide protection.
New York enacted section 3031 before Roth and Sindermann
were decided. That section is not a response to the Supreme Court's
refusal to offer probationers protection, but, rather, a reaction to
momentum which had been generated in the movement for procedurally safeguarding probationary teachers. The total inadequacy of
section 3031, and the Supreme Court's refusal to supply aggrieved probationary teachers adequate protection requires-in the interest of
justice-renovation of section 3031 into true fair-dismissal legislation.
IV.

THE BEST SOLUTION: EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION

Comparison of the weak, non-specific provisions of section 3031
procedures currently in force in New York City with "ideal" alternatives proposed by various analysts reveals the direction that statutory revision should take.
A. The New York City Alternative
As a city of more than one million New York is exempted from
compliance with section 3031 and is responsible for establishing its
own procedural protection of probationary teachers.7 r Its program for
73. 408 U.S. at 578-79.
74. 22 BUFFALO L. Rav. 624, 634 (1973).

75. It is consistent with the entire scheme of New York's Education Law to have
excluded "cities having a population of one million or more." The format of the Education Law is to provide differently for districts serving significantly differing populations. Separate articles of the law deal with the differently populated districts; e.g.,
article 51 applies to city districts of less than 125,000 and article 52 to city districts of
more than 125,000. N.Y. EDuc. LAW art. 51-52 (McKinney Supp. 1973). But New
York City's recently decentralized system is subject to its own strict dismissal procedures and this is probably the reason that the city was excluded from the effects of
section 3031.
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protecting probationers is prescribed by the Bylaws of the New York
City Board of Education, which, in turn, conform to agreements the
Board has negotiated with the UFT. The procedures which govern
dealings with probationary teachers in New York City insure teachers'
rights extending far beyond a simple "due process hearing." The following list of provisions summarizes those rights: 76 (1) An individual
rating-report is made respecting each teacher at the end of each year
of employment. A copy of this report must be conveyed to the teacher
within ten days, and not fewer than four days, of the end of the
school year. A rating of U (unsatisfactory) must be accompanied by
reasons. (2) These annual ratings may be appealed under procedures
outlined in Bylaw 105-a. The teacher is provided full access to all
documented evidence against him and the opportunity to rebut with
counsel and witnesses before a committee appointed by the Chancellor.
The committee's findings are then submitted to the Chancellor for
final action. This full-blown proceeding is available to an individual
who simply wants to contest the rating that has been given for one
year of service. (8) The ratings may cumulatively be used for documentation of a recommendation that a probationer be dismissed. (4)
A recommendation of this sort automatically initiates a 105-a reviewthe teacher does not have to appeal. (5) Teachers on probation with
at least three years of service are entitled to the same review procedures established for tenured teachers under section 2590 (j) (7) of the
Education Law.
These provisions provide extremely strong protection for the probationers' interests. Certain of them, number (5) in particular, border on overreaching and may tend to make discharge of a truly undesirable teacher overly burdensome to the local board. A probationary
period for teachers is a reasonable requirement, allowed so that performance can be assessed. If during probation the superintendent legitimately finds a teacher to be incompetent and recommends dismissal,
the local board must be free, after a hearingon the merits, to discharge
the teacher. Fair pretermination procedures are advocated in order
to eliminate unjustified dismissals and to offer greater job security to
76. This summary is composed of information culled from: "special circulars" of

the Board of Education of the City of New York Office of Personnel No. 108 (Apr.
26, 1973); id., No. Ill (May 3, 1973); Bylaws of the Board of Education of the City
of New York § 105-a. This author is indebted and grateful to Dr. Dennis Hayes, Act-

ing Executive Director of the Board of Education of the City of New York, who provided those materials.
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the competent teacher. Those objectives are not furthered by making
the discharge of inadequate third year probationers77 as difficult to
achieve as that of a tenured employee. The effect of pretermination
procedures must be to promote protection of good teachers, not to insulate the inadequate ones.
B. Proposed Alternatives
An alternative which strikes an equitable balance between the ineffective section 3031 and the hyper-effective New York City provisions is recommended by H. Winthrop Pettigrew and Lowell B.
Howard.78 Premising that no teacher should be deprived of his substantive rights, they indicate provisions which they consider essential
to insuring those rights and propose additional measures which they
think highly desirable. Essential are:
(1) notice of the specific reasons for dismissal or nonretention, (2)
a hearing on those reasons and notice of such a hearing, and (3)
the opportunity to be present at the hearing and to respond to the
70
stated reasons for dismissal or nonretention
Highly desirable would be provisions that require:
(1) the ultimate decision . . .as to nonretention ...

rest upon the

charges of which the teacher was notified, (2) the ultimate decision
• * .be based on a finding of facts which were submitted at the hearing, and (3) the hearing.., be held by an impartial tribunal8 0
The Howard-Pettigrew model provides a near-perfect alternative to the
present New York statute. The only features it lacks are a requirement
for documentation of a teacher's classroom competency, and an indication of standards by which the evidence should be assessed. In the
interest of meaningful proceedings these additional provisions should
be appended to the Howard-Pettigrew proposal: (1) annual evaluations of each teacher's classroom performance made by an impartial,
77. The fact that the statutory term of tenure for New York teachers is incredibly
lengthy has not been dealt with in this Comment because it is tangential to the subject

here considered. It is, however, a subject deserving of attention from both legal analysts and our legislators.
78. Pettigrew & Howard, The ProbationaryProfessor and the Constitution: A Sug-

gested Model Hearing for Contract Nonrenewal Cases, 8

CALIF. WE.STERN

(1971). Another set of proposed procedures is set forth in Van Alstyne 865.
79. Pettigrew & Howard, supra note 78, at 60.

80. Id. at 60-61.

L. Rv. 1
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but expert, observer, (2) filing of those annual reports, so that they
are available as evidence at any hearing on the competence of that
teacher, (3) a clear statement of what does not qualify as just cause
for dismissal. These combined measures would present a program designed to work towards the ultimate goal: attainment of pretermination
protection of probationers.
CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in the Roth case, categorically denied that procedural due process regarding teacher employment was constitutionally required, and emphatically refused to mandate it judicially. The negative thrust of this holding was tempered
somewhat by his indication that the Court did not deny the probable
usefulness of and justification for the individual states' seeking to legislate protective measures. 81 The statute passed by the New York legislature which purports to establish procedures exacting fair treatment
for untenured teachers actually does very little to insure fair dismissal. School districts wishing to rid themselves of dissident faculty
members, and seeking to avoid awarding tenure, can still do so. The
statute provides no protection, even for accomplished and accomplishing teachers. Their loss to the school system, in addition to frustrating the rights of those teachers, penalizes both the students and the
community by denying them the benefit of the teachers' talents.
The Supreme Court has issued an invitation to the states to enact
legislation which would offer teachers protection. It would behoove
New York's legislature to produce a law in language exact and in scope
broad enough to insure pretermination procedural due process.
ELIZABETH LANG
81.

408 U.S. at 578-79.

